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The quantitative μ-calculus qMμ extends the applicability of Kozen’s standard μ-calculus [5] to
probabilistic systems. Subsequent to its introduction [9,4] it has been developed by us [6,7,8] and
by others [2]. Beyond its natural application to deﬁne probabilistic temporal logic [10], there are a
number of other areas that beneﬁt from its use.
One application is stochastic two-player games, and the contribution of this paper is to depart from
the usual notion of “absolute winning conditions” and to introduce a novel game in which players
can “draw”.
The extension is motivated by examples based on economic games: we propose an extension to
qMμ so that they can be speciﬁed; we show that the extension can be expressed via a reduction
to the original logic; and, via that reduction, we prove that the players can play optimally in the
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1 Introduction
Probabilistic systems combine standard features of computer systems and
random events, thus a signiﬁcant number of their properties are quantita-
tive rather than qualitative and cannot be veriﬁed using standard methods.
Quantitative program logics [4,9,14] have been developed to overcome the lim-
itations of ordinary program logic by speciﬁcally taking into account prob-
abilistic actions. In particular the quantitative μ-calculus qMμ extends the
standard μ-calculus of Kozen [5], giving access to probabilities by interpreting
terms as real- rather than Boolean-valued functions of the state. As in the
standard μ-calculus, qMμ comprises a modelling language with a simple de-
notational semantics, as well as an operational interpretation as a two-player
game extending Stirling [12] and establishing a formal link to stochastic parity
games [1] and their associated algorithmic methods of veriﬁcation.
However not all games ﬁt naturally within this framework, and in this pa-
per we investigate one novel game which arises in the speciﬁcation of some (not
necessarily probabilistic) systems, and show how the quantitative μ-calculus
nevertheless can successfully accommodate it.
As an example of the type of games we study, we consider the situation
in which two players called Max and Min are given a pile of twenty $1 coins
to share between each other. They agree to execute the following protocol
to ensure a fair division: ﬁrst Min chooses an amount s to give to Max who
either accepts or rejects it. In the case that he accepts, Min then receives
$(20−s); otherwise she is forced to choose again. Essentially there are only
two outcomes of this game — either play ends after some ﬁnite time with Max
and Min having divided the coins to their mutual satisfaction; or they play
indeﬁnitely, never able to agree.
In standard (and quantitative) μ-calculus, inﬁnite executions are dealt with
via ﬁxed points — essentially the greatest ﬁxed point is interpreted as an ab-
solute win for Max and the least ﬁxed point the opposite, i.e. an absolute win
for Min. In the above protocol however, it seems clear that the inﬁnite execu-
tion should be judged as some kind of “draw” or at least a “stalemate”, rather
than a decisive win for either player, an outcome which cannot be modelled by
either a single least- or greatest ﬁxed point. The solution we adopt leads us to
propose a new kind of ﬁxed point which we identify with intermediate winning
conditions. In particular our contributions can be summarised as follows.
(i) A simple extension to the quantitative μ-calculus allowing games exhibit-
ing intermediate “draws” to be speciﬁed directly (Sec. 3 and Sec. 4);
(ii) A demonstration that such games are indeed well deﬁned in the tradi-
tional sense of game theory, by which we mean that the players can assess
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the eﬀect of their strategies relative to those of the other player and that
the two players can each follow optimal strategies (Sec. 4);
(iii) A detailed case study inspired by an economic application, and a method
for analysis based on the above theoretical results (Sec. 5).
Crucial to the approach will be the use of qMμ, and in Sec. 2 we review its
interpretation over probabilistic systems.
Throughout, the following notational conventions apply. An inﬁx ‘.’ is
used for function application. We write S for a (ﬁxed) underlying state space,
and S for the set of discrete probability distributions over S, where a discrete
probability distribution is a function from S to the interval [0, 1] which is nor-
malised to 1; thus S =ˆ {Δ:S → [0, 1] |
∑
s∈S Δ.s = 1}. The set of functions
from S to the real interval [0, 1] is denoted by ES, and called the expectations
over S. Real-valued functions over S (e.g. expectations) are ordered by lifting
the pointwise the order ≤ on the reals; functions max and min are similarly
lifted; and we write x for the constant function returning some real x for all
states, where usually we will have 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. If Δ is a probability distribution
over S and A is a measurable function on S then
∫
Δ
A denotes the expected
value of A with respect to Δ. When Δ is in S and A is a bounded real-valued
function over S, this reduces to
∑
s:S Δ.s×A.s.
2 Quantitative qMμ-calculus and games
In this section we summarise the details of the μ-calculus, beginning with the
deﬁnition of the language, and then reviewing how formulae can be interpreted
in two equivalent ways over probabilistic transition systems. Formulae φ in
the logic (in positive form) are constructed as follows:
X | A | {k}φ | φ1  φ2 | φ1 unionsq φ2 | φ1  G φ2 | (μX · φ) | (νX · φ)
In the interpretations of the formulae, the following meanings will be given.
• Variables X are used for binding ﬁxed points.
• Terms A stand for ﬁxed functions (normally) in ES.
• Terms k represent labelled probabilistic transitions (described below).
• Terms G describe Boolean functions of S, i.e. (“if”)  G  (“else”).
• (μX · φ) and (νX · φ) are extremal ﬁxed points, binding any free X’s in φ.
We avoid use of the usual modalities 〈·〉 and [·] forming respectively angelic-
(existential-) and demonic (universal-) choices, as they can be expressed equiv-
alently (in the assumptions of our framework) by a combination of {k}φ and
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unionsq and . 4
Next we show how to interpret the above language over a probabilistic
transition system. Such a transition system is modelled by functions from
initial states in S to ﬁnal distributions in S, where the distributions model
probabilistic features present in the system. In this paper we shall use labels
to distinguish the various probability distributions within a given result set
— thus our abstract computational model is (strictly speaking) labelled prob-
abilistic transition systems. 5 Let L be a (ﬁnite) index set of labels; we write
R.L.S for a labelled probabilistic transition system over S, so that it has the
type L → S → S . Thus given a label and an initial state, the result is a single
output distribution in S, which we call a transition probability distribution.
In order to interpret a formula over a given (labelled) probabilistic tran-
sition system r ∈ R.L.S, we use the standard technique of valuations from
denotational semantics [13] which works roughly as follows. Given a formula
φ, a valuation V does four things: (i) it maps each A in φ to a ﬁxed expectation
in ES; (ii) it maps each k to a ﬁxed label, and thus {k} to the corresponding
ﬁxed probabilistic transition determined by r; (iii) it maps each G to a pred-
icate over S; and (iv) it keeps track of the current instances of “unfoldings”
of ﬁxed points, by including mappings for bound variables X. (For notational
economy, in (iv) we are allowing V to take over the role usually given to a
separate “environment” parameter.)
Formulae can be interpreted in two equivalent ways [6]: denotationally,
extending Kozen [5], or operationally as a game, extending Stirling [12]. We
now present each in turn.
The denotational interpretation gives the meaning of a formula φ as
a function in ES, generalising Kozen’s interpretation as a Boolean function of
S [5]. Let φ be a formula and V a valuation. We write ||φ||V for its meaning
determined by the rules given in Fig. 1.
The operational interpretation of a formula φ is in terms of general-
isation of Stirling’s turn-based games [12], which we call Stochastic Stirling
Games (SSG ’s). The game is between two players we call Max and Min;
Max ’s objective is to maximise a certain “payoﬀ” (deﬁned below) and Min’s
is to minimise it. Play progresses through a sequence of game positions, each
4 The modality 〈K〉φ for example is equivalent to the angelic choice over all terms of the
form {k}φ, for k in the (ﬁnite) subset K.
5 In this paper, however, labels play no role except as convenient “markers” to distinguish
diﬀerent distributions; they are not, for example, used to express path properties of the
computational sequences.
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(i) ||A||V =ˆ V.A .
(ii) ||{k}φ||V .s =ˆ
∫
V .k.s
||φ||V .
(iii) ||φ′  φ′′||V .s =ˆ ||φ
′||V .s min ||φ
′′||V .s ;
and ||φ′ unionsq φ′′||V .s =ˆ ||φ
′||V .s max ||φ
′′||V .s .
(iv) ||φ′  G φ′′||V .s =ˆ ||φ
′||V .s if (V.G.s) else ||φ
′′||V .s .
(v) ||(μX · φ)||V =ˆ (lfp ε · ||φ||V[X →ε]) , where by (lfp ε · exp) we mean the
least ﬁxed-point of the function (λε · exp) in ES → ES.
(vi) ||(νX · φ)||V =ˆ (gfp ε · ||φ||V[X →ε]) .
Note that in the valuation V[X →ε], the variable X is re-mapped to the expecta-
tion ε, and the ﬁxed points exist because the least- and greatest expectations
in ES are 0 and 1.
Fig. 1. Kozen-style denotational semantics for qMμ
of which is either a pair (φ, s) where φ is a formula and s is a state in S, or is
a single (y) for some real-valued payoﬀ y in [0, 1]. Following Stirling, we will
use “colours” to handle repeated returns to a ﬁxed point.
A sequence of game positions is called a game path and is of the form
(φ0, s0), (φ1, s1), . . . with (if ﬁnite) a payoﬀ position (y) at the end. The
initial formula φ0 is the given φ, and s0 is an initial state in S. A move from
position (φi, si) to (φi+1, si+1) or to (y) is speciﬁed by the rules of Fig. 2.
Imagine that the two players play according to the rules in Fig. 2, given a
formula φ and an initial state s0, and suppose ﬁrst that there are no proba-
bilistic transitions. In this simple case the result would be a single game path
recording the actual sequence of game positions observed during a play, where
the players have decided “on the ﬂy” how to resolve their choices as they go
along. Alternatively, and to achieve the same eﬀect, they could formulate a
strategy beforehand to resolve their choices depending on how the game has
progressed so far. We call such strategies pre-determined, and we model them
as functions σ : paths → {true, false}, i.e. from ﬁnite game paths to Booleans.
We use the convention that true corresponds to “take the left branch at a 
(or unionsq)”, and false to “take the right branch at a  (or unionsq)”. The idea is that at
each relevant game position the player “looks up” his strategy after a particu-
lar (ﬁnite) play which then determines whether to continue play by following
the left- or the right branch. As the strategies take paths as arguments, they
model unlimited memory. We write σ and σ for pre-determined strategies as
would be used by Min and Max respectively.
Now suppose more generally that the transitions can be probabilistic; this
means that some of the moves are determined by chance. Nevertheless the
players can still play according to their respective strategies, but this time the
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If the current game position is (φ, s), then play proceeds as follows:
1. If φ is A then the game terminates in position (y) where y = V.A.s .
2. if φ is {k}φ then the distribution V.k.s is used to choose a next state s′ in
S: the next game position is (φ, s′) (with probability V.k.s.s′).
3. If φ is φ′  φ′′ (resp. φ′ unionsq φ′′) then Min (resp. Max ) chooses one of the
minjuncts (maxjuncts): the next game position is (φ, s), where φ is the
chosen ’junct φ′ or φ′′.
4. If φ is φ′  G  φ′′, the next game position is (φ′, s) if V.G.s holds, and
otherwise it is (φ′′, s).
5. If φ is (μX · φ) (resp. (νX · φ)) then a fresh colour C is chosen and is bound
to the formula φ[X →C], in which X has been replaced by C, for later use; the
next game position is (C, s). (This use of colours makes easy determination
of which recursion operator actually “caused” an inﬁnite path — see below.)
6. If φ is a colour C, then the next game position is (Φ, s), where Φ is the
formula bound previously to C.
The game begins with a closed formula. Inﬁnite plays always result in there
being exactly one colour C that occurs inﬁnitely often [12,8].
The outcome of the game is determined by a payoﬀ function called Val, which
is deﬁned as follows. Note that it is both insensitive to the colours and length
on ﬁnite paths.
7. The path π is ﬁnite, terminating in a game state (y); in this case the value
Val.π is y.
8. The path π is inﬁnite and there is (exactly one) colour C appearing inﬁnitely
often that was generated by a greatest (resp. least) ﬁxed-point ν (resp. μ);
in this case Val.π is 1 (resp. 0).
Fig. 2. Rules for the Stochastic Stirling Game.
result of their doing so is not a single possible game path, but a set of paths,
each one labelled (at least for ﬁnite paths) with the probability of occurrence
in a play of the game. More generally the structure represents a probability
distribution over game paths. For example let the formula be
ψ =ˆ {s: = s0 1/2⊕ s: = s1}(1  (μX · X)) ,(1)
where we have instantiated a particular transition (rather than writing k),
allowing it to stand for itself, and we use s0 and s1 for states in S. We are
also using P p⊕ Q to denote a probabilistic transition in which P is selected
with probability p and Q with probability 1−p. Now let Min’s strategy be “if
the state s is s0 take the left branch, otherwise take the right branch”; we use
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C for the colour binding the least ﬁxed point. The two paths generated when
Min plays according to her strategy are
both occurring with probability 1/2. In fact the probability distribution over
game paths is deﬁned by the well-known measure [3] generated by the partic-
ular probabilistic transitions of the underlying transition system. We call the
so-generated distribution a path distribution. Clearly a diﬀerent path distri-
bution will be generated if Min follows a diﬀerent strategy. More generally,
given strategy sequences σ and σ we write [[φ]]σ,σ
V
.s0 for the resulting path
distribution over game paths when Min and Max play according to σ and σ
respectively starting from s0.
Next, we consider the payoﬀ function Val. According to the rules in Fig. 2
we see in our example at (1) that Val.π0 = 1, since it is a ﬁnite path with ﬁnal
constant term 1, but that Val.π1 = 0, since the inﬁnitely-occurring colour C
was generated by a least ﬁxed point. Thus the expected payoﬀ with respect
to the distribution over game paths with Min playing the above strategy is
1/2 × Val.π0 + 1/2 × Val.π1 = 1/2. More generally we write
∫
[[φ]]
σ,σ
V
.s0
Val ,for the
expected payoﬀ with respect to the path distribution generated when Min and
Max follow strategy sequences σ and σ from initial state s0. It is well deﬁned
since Val is integrable over the σ-algebra of game paths [14].
We say that the game as a whole is well deﬁned (in the sense that each
player can play rationally, i.e. can assess a particular strategy relative to all the
other player’s strategies), if the minimax over all possible strategy sequences
of the expected payoﬀ is equal to the maximin. That is, for all s in S we must
have
σ unionsqσ
∫
[[φ]]
σ,σ
V
.s
Val = unionsqσ σ
∫
[[φ]]
σ,σ
V
.s
Val .(2)
We call this the value of the game, and often refer to it as V ∗. A strategy
σ∗ is optimal for Min if
∫
[[φ]]
σ∗,σ
V
.s
Val ≤ V ∗ for all Max strategies σ; similarly a
strategy σ∗ is optimal for Max if
∫
[[φ]]
σ,σ∗
V
.s
Val ≥ V ∗ for all Min strategies σ.
The following results summarise the relationship between SSG ’s and the
denotational interpretation of qMμ; they are both proved elsewhere [6,7,8].
Theorem 2.1 In ﬁnite state spaces, a Stochastic Stirling Game given by for-
mula φ is well deﬁned and its value V ∗ is equal to its denotation ||φ||V.
 (μX · X), s1), ((μX · X), s1), (C, s1), (C, s1), · · ·) ,
 (μX · X), s0), (1)) , and
π1 =ˆ ((ψ, s0), (1
π0 =ˆ ((ψ, s0), (1
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Thus, for ψ deﬁned at (1), the associated SSG has value 0, since that is
its denotation according to the rules set out in Fig. 1.
Amongst player strategies, the memoryless ones are particularly signiﬁcant,
where a strategy is said to be memoryless if it is independent of the history,
only depending on the current game position.
Theorem 2.2 In ﬁnite state spaces S, each player playing an SSG has a
memoryless optimal strategy.
We usually write σ∗ and σ∗ for the optimal strategies.
One consequence of Thm. 2.2 is that, given a valuation V, each speciﬁc
unionsq and  in a formula φ may be replaced by a speciﬁc Boolean choice, where
the choice depends only on the underlying state space S, so that all “on-line”
choices made by either player can be removed. When players play memoryless
strategies the resulting probabilistic structure is essentially a Markov chain
[3].
For the game given by ψ at (1) Min’s optimal strategy is “always take the
right branch”, which is equivalent to replacing the  in ψ with (· false ·) to
yield a formula ψ′ =ˆ {x: = 0 1/2⊕ x: = 1}(1 false (μX · X). Observe that
the formerly present choices of Min have been eﬀectively removed, forcing her
to follow the instantiated memoryless strategy — Thm. 2.2 guarantees that
the value of the new ψ′-game is the same as the value of the original ψ-game.
As we see, the instantiated Boolean choice always selects the inﬁnite iteration,
with a payoﬀ of 0 for both paths.
More generally if σ (σ) represents a memoryless strategy for Min (Max )
then we write φσ ( φσ) for the formula with each syntactic occurrence of 
(unionsq) replaced by the Boolean choices determined by σ (σ) as illustrated above.
3 Generalising the payoﬀ for inﬁnite play
In this section we introduce our generalisation of SSG ’s — we call them
Asymptotic SSG ’s. Roughly speaking, the idea is to extend the deﬁnition
of Val so that along speciﬁed inﬁnite paths the payoﬀ is not restricted to be 0
or 1, but can take some other (constant) value x lying strictly in between.
To illustrate we return to the game between Max and Min described in
the introduction. First we encode a single move of the protocol in qMμ using
the rules in Fig. 2 as a guide. Let Min’s choice be given by the transition
Choose =ˆ s:∈{0 . . . 20}, where we are using the shorthand “:∈” to indicate
a minimising choice from the set concerned. Next Max has the choice of
accepting s, or rejecting it and forcing Min to choose again. We deﬁne the
real-valued function Accept to return the value of the choice oﬀered in the
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current state s, so that if s = 3 then in fact Accept.s = 3 as well. (That is,
because the state itself is real-valued, the constant expectation is the identity
in this case.) Thus we can model Max’s move with the sub-formula AcceptunionsqX,
where X is a variable to be bound to a ﬁxed point to model the repetition in the
case of rejection. In all, that suggests a formula (τ X · {Choose }(AcceptunionsqX)),
formally describing the desired protocol for dividing the money — but where
we have introduced an undeﬁned-for-now ﬁxed point binding τ for X, as we
try to decide which one to use.
The ﬁrst thing to notice about our proposed formula is that the payoﬀ
is not constrained to lie between [0, 1], which was one of the assumptions
set out in the rules of the game in Fig. 2: for example Min might choose
s = 20 and Max might accept. However this is not a signiﬁcant issue provided
that all the payoﬀs lie within a bounded and closed subset of the reals. In
such cases we can always transform the game using an aﬃne transformation, 6
which can shift and scale the payoﬀ functions without changing the underlying
probabilistic transitions. In this case all we need do is scale Accept by 1/20.
The next lemma sets out the details in general.
Lemma 3.1 Consider a formula φ, and a valuation which maps constant ex-
pectations A in φ to some interval [a, b] (with a < b). If Val awards a payoﬀ
of a to inﬁnite paths won by Min, and b to inﬁnite paths won by Max, then the
value of the game is α−1.(||φ||(α.V)), where α is the aﬃne transformation map-
ping [a, b] onto [0, 1] and the term α.V is deﬁned so that only the constant terms
speciﬁed in V are transformed; the transition probabilities are unchanged.
Even with the transformed game (τ X · {Choose}((Accept/20) unionsq X)), we
still have the problem of deciding which ﬁxed point to use. A greatest ﬁxed
point would award the maximum 1 for an inﬁnite play, corresponding to Max
taking all 20 coins; on the other hand a least ﬁxed point would award to an
inﬁnite play a value of 0, allowing the bias to favour Min so that she wins
everything.
Our intention is that the stalemate situation should correspond to an equal
split — thus eﬀectively Min is forced to divide the pile of coins into two equal
parts, which Max must accept. That corresponds to a game which allows
inﬁnite plays to be awarded a constant value of 1/2; put another way, this
encourages us to deﬁne a new kind of ﬁxed point where inﬁnite iteration is
awarded 1/2 rather than 0 or 1. Thus we ﬁrm up our new ﬁxed-point notation,
6 An aﬃne transformation t is a combination of scaling by a ﬁxed factor and a shift by a
constant amount, and can be deﬁned t.e =ˆ γ × e + δ. We restrict to aﬃne transformations
where the scaling factor γ is non-negative.
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explicitly annotating the τ with the value it is to award to inﬁnite plays, i.e.
(τ
1/2
X · {Choose}((Accept/20) unionsqX)) ,
where in general a τx indicates that its inﬁnite plays are awarded x.
In the next section we turn to the main contribution of this paper: we pro-
vide the necessary theory to show that games with such intermediate payoﬀs
for inﬁnite paths are indeed well deﬁned, and that the players have optimal
strategies for them. Crucial to our argument is to show that they have an
(unusual) denotational interpretation in qMμ, for that then lets us appeal
immediately to Thms. 2.1 and 2.2.
4 Extended qMμ and Asymptotic SSG’s
With Lem. 3.1, we can without loss of generality work within the interval
[0, 1]. We begin by deﬁning a new language constructor τx which provides the
“intermediate” type of loop back introduced informally above.
Deﬁnition 4.1 We extend the quantitative μ-calculus by adding the new
constructor (τx X · φ) to the earlier deﬁnition in Sec. 2.
7 Here x is any real
satisfying 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
Next, as in Fig. 2, we can deﬁne similarly a game based on unfolding
any expression in the extended quantitative μ-calculus — indeed the rules for
plays are unchanged, with the only substantial modiﬁcation being the winning
condition relative to the new constructor.
Deﬁnition 4.2 Given an expression in the extended μ-calculus, the associ-
ated Asymptotic SSG is played as set out in Fig. 2, with the following modi-
ﬁcations.
5′. If φ is (τx X · φ) then a fresh colour C is chosen and is bound to the formula φ[X →C] for later
use; the next game position is (C, s).
9. If a colour belonging to a τx occurs inﬁnitely often along a path, the payoﬀ is x.
Unfortunately for our putative Def. 4.2 there remains the question of well-
deﬁnedness when we consider the minimax value of such a game — recall
that this relies on an equality of the form (2). Given strategy sequences, the
expected payoﬀ
∫
[[φ]]
σ,σ
V
.s
Val is indeed well deﬁned [6] — however it is not immediate
that the minimax of expected payoﬀs is equal to the maximin. Below we show
nevertheless that they are equal, and give methods for computing the value.
7 At the same time we could if we wished dispense with the original least- and greatest
ﬁxed-point operators μ, ν, replacing them by τ0 , τ1 respectively.
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Our approach is to reduce the asymptotic game to a standard SSG, by
expressing it as a qMμ formula, and then appealing to Thm. 2.1. Throughout
we work with a ﬁxed valuation V. For simplicity we shall only consider for-
mulae of the form ΦA =ˆ (τx X · Φ), where Φ is ﬁxed-point free and contains no
variables other than X. We will refer to the associated game as the asymptotic
game; the next deﬁnition gives a standard qMμ formula which we shall show
is equivalent to it.
Deﬁnition 4.3 Given a qMμ formula Φ with a single free variable X (but
possibly occurring in several positions), so that (τx X · Φ) is in the extended
quantitative μ-calculus, we deﬁne the x-gadget game to be the SSG corre-
sponding to the qMμ formula
ΦG =ˆ (νY · (μZ · Φ(Z unionsq (Y  x)))) ,
where in general by Φ(expr) we mean Φ[X →expr ].
8
Although Def. 4.3 seems quite odd, the interleaving of the ﬁxed points
allows the players essentially to “simulate” the asymptotic game; Def. 4.3
is also a ﬁxed point of (the denotation of) Φ(·), although in general neither
the greatest nor the least. Intuitively we have speciﬁed a “get out and take
x” clause, ensuring that it is controlled by neither player independently —
the extra decision to be resolved by Max ensures that the game does not
end prematurely, resulting in a payoﬀ that is too small. Similarly Min can
ensure that the payoﬀ is not too large. The only remaining case is for Min to
terminate the game for an immediate payoﬀ of x — but as we shall see that
happens exactly when the original asymptotic game would have resulted in
an inﬁnite τx -path when both players play optimally. Next we consider how
to formalise the above argument. We proceed in two stages, summarised as
follows.
• First we deﬁne a new game via formula ΦH = (τx Y · (μZ · Φ(Z unionsq Y )));
it corresponds directly to the asymptotic game, ΦA. We show that the
two games generate isomorphic path distributions, and therefore that their
expected payoﬀs correspond.
• Second we show that there is similarly a direct correspondence between ΦH
and the x-gadget game, ΦG, deﬁned above.
Turning now to the details, the following two lemmas deal with the ﬁrst
8 We note that this technique of reducibility — forcing Min and Max to compete via
the interleaved ﬁxed points and extra decision points — is reminiscent of the “gadgets”
invented by Henzinger et. al. for converting a stochastic parity game to a standard (non-
stochastic) parity game [1], with corresponding, though not equivalent properties. Here the
correspondence turns out to be exact.
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stage, and set up the correspondence between ΦA and ΦH .
Lemma 4.4 Given any strategy sequences σ and σ for ΦA, there exist strategy
sequences σ′ and σ′ for ΦH such that the resulting path distributions correspond.
Proof (Sketch) Comparing the syntactic construction given in Fig. 2 of ΦA
and ΦH we observe only two diﬀerences. The ﬁrst is that the extra ﬁxed point
in ΦH produces extra “colour” positions, and the second is that the extra unionsq at
Z unionsq Y , also in ΦH , leads to an extra choice for Max. Nevertheless most of the
game moves are exactly the same: that is because all moves deﬁned by Φ —
which make up the bulk of the activity — are identical in the two formulae. In
particular the ﬁnite paths ending in a constant term must be determined by
navigating through Φ. Thus we can deﬁne σ′ and σ′ by forcing the players of
ΦH to copy the decisions encoded in σ and σ for unwrapping Φ; the resolution
of the extra unionsq at Z unionsq Y can be arbitrary. The result is that the proportions
of ﬁnite and inﬁnite paths must be the same in the path distributions for the
two games (since the option to repeat is determined within Φ); moreover each
ﬁnite path in [[ΦA]]
σ,σ
V
.s corresponds to a ﬁnite path in [[ΦH ]]
σ′,σ′
V
.s, terminating
with the same real. The result follows. 
The next lemma shows that the expected payoﬀs correspond with respect
to the payoﬀ functions.
Lemma 4.5 Let σ, σ be strategy sequences for ΦA, and let σ
′, σ′ be derived
strategies for ΦH as in Lem. 4.4. The following inequality holds:∫
[[ΦA]]
σ,σ
V
.s
Val ≥
∫
[[ΦH ]]
σ′,σ′
V
.s
Val .(3)
Proof (Sketch) By Lem. 4.4 the two path distributions correspond, thus the
inequality at (3) will follow provided that the payoﬀ function awards values
in the ΦA case are at least as great as those it awards in the ΦH case. But
this follows immediately, since by Lem. 4.4 (again) the ﬁnite paths correspond
and from Fig. 2 the payoﬀs on those paths are the same. Considering now
the payoﬀs for inﬁnite paths, we see that ΦA, with only one ﬁxed point τx ,
generates inﬁnite paths containing a single colour, thus it must be awarded a
payoﬀ of x by Def. 4.2. On the other hand ΦH , with two ﬁxed points, generates
inﬁnite paths in which the inﬁnite colour was generated either by a μ or a τx .
In the former case, Val awards 0 (recall Fig. 2) and in the latter case it awards
x (recall Def. 4.2). Either way the payoﬀ is no more than x and the result
now follows by monotonicity. 
Now we have accomplished the ﬁrst stage of the argument, our next task
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is to show how ΦH and the gadget-game ΦG correspond.
Lemma 4.6 Let C be the colour bound to the outermost ﬁxed point in ΦH .
Given strategy sequences σ and σ for ΦH there exists a strategy sequence σ
′,
and for each n ≥ 0 a strategy sequence σ′n such that∫
[[ΦH ]]
σ,σ
V
.s
Valn =
∫
[[ΦG]]
σ′
n
,σ′
V
.s
Val ,(4)
where Valn is deﬁned to be Val on paths which have no more than n occurrences
of the colour C, and x otherwise.
Proof (Sketch) As in Lem. 4.4 we see that the syntactic rules from Fig. 2
applied to ΦH and ΦG are almost the same. The only diﬀerences this time are
that the outer-most ﬁxed point is τx in ΦH and ν in ΦG, and that there is an
extra x in ΦG. The eﬀect of the latter diﬀerence is that Min playing ΦG has
the additional option to terminate the game in a ﬁnite play for an immediate
payoﬀ of x. For all other cases (when she does not decide to terminate there),
the players playing ΦG can simply copy all the moves made by the players
playing ΦH . Thus, as before, we deﬁne σ
′ to be the strategy which copies all
the corresponding decisions encoded in σ.
To deﬁne σ′n we must take Valn into account. Consider any game path
generated by ΦH which has more than n occurrences of a colour C (for arbitrary
states s); by deﬁnition Valn awards each such path a value of x. To obtain the
equivalence at (4) above we need to show that the corresponding paths in ΦG
can also be awarded a payoﬀ of x. We do that by exploiting the extra x in ΦG
to terminate the ΦG-game early for those paths. Note ﬁrst that since outer-
most ﬁxed points generate a single colour, there is a direct correspondence
between the number of C-colour positions in ΦH and the number of C
′-colour
positions in ΦG, where C
′ is the colour bound to the outer-most ﬁxed point in
ΦG. Deﬁne σ
′
n to behave like σ for all decisions not involving the extra , and
to select the left branch at the extra  (i.e. not to terminate early) if there
are fewer than n C′-colour positions, and to select the right branch otherwise
(i.e. terminate the game early for an immediate payoﬀ of x). The result now
follows. 
Having completed the second stage, we can ﬁnally prove our desired cor-
respondence.
Lemma 4.7 Let σ∗ and σ∗ be the optimal strategies for the x-gadget game
ΦG, and let σ and σ be arbitrary strategy sequences for the asymptotic game
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ΦA; further let V
∗ be ||ΦG||V as before. Then the following inequalities hold:
∫
[[Φσ
∗
A ]]
σ
V
.s
Val ≥ V ∗ ≥
∫
[[Φ
σ∗
A
]]σ
V
.s
Val
where we have used directly σ∗ and σ∗ as memoryless strategies for the ΦA
game (see explanation below).
Proof.
We give the proof only of the ﬁrst inequality — a dual argument works for
the second.
We write Φσ
∗
A ,Φ
σ∗
H and Φ
σ∗
G for the formulae with all occurrences of unionsq re-
placed by the (relevant) Boolean-choice determined by the memoryless σ∗ (we
can do that since the unionsq’s correspond syntactically in Φ, for example, and the
replacement simply applies directly the “copying” strategy for Max deﬁned at
Lem. 4.4 and Lem. 4.6). The result is implied by the following relationships:∫
[[Φσ
∗
A ]]
σ
V
.s
Val ≥
∫
[[Φσ
∗
H ]]
σ′
V
.s
Val = lim
n→∞
∫
[[Φσ
∗
H ]]
σ′
V
.s
Valn = lim
n→∞
∫
[[Φσ
∗
G ]]
σ′′
n
V
.s
Val ≥ V ∗ .
The ﬁrst inequality follows from Lem. 4.5; the next equality follows from a
standard continuity result for integration (specialised to game trees [6]); the
next follows from Lem. 4.6, and the last follows since σ∗ is optimal for Max
playing ΦG, by deﬁnition. 
We can now prove our main theorem, generalising Thm. 2.1 and Thm. 2.2
for games in which inﬁnite plays result in a payoﬀ of x.
Theorem 4.8 The asymptotic game has the same value as the x-gadget game.
That is, the interpretation of (τx X · Φ) as determined by Fig. 2 and Def. 4.2
is equal to the interpretation of (νY · μX · Φ(X unionsq (Y  x))) as determined by
Fig. 2 alone.
Moreover the players in the asymptotic game have optimal memoryless
strategies determined by those for the x-gadget game.
Proof. Let V ∗, σ∗ and σ∗ be the value, and optimal strategies for the x-gadget
game — they exist by Thms. 2.1 and 2.2. We have the following sequence of
inequalities, by appealing ﬁrst to Lem. 4.7 (recalling that σ is arbitrary) and
then monotonicity:
V ∗ ≤ σ
∫
[[Φσ
∗
A
]]
σ
V
.s
Val ≤ unionsqσ σ
∫
[[ΦA]]
σ,σ
V
.s
Val .
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By similar arguments we also have
σ unionsqσ
∫
[[Φσ
∗
]]
σ
V
.s
Val ≤ V ∗
which, put together with the earlier inequalities, shows that the maximin
dominates the minimax of the asymptotic game. But trivially a minimax
dominates a maximin — and so the value V ∗ of ΦG is “squashed between” the
(equal) minimax and maximin values of the ΦA game.

5 Investing on the Stock Market
In this section we illustrate the extended μ-calculus with a small case study
[6] which we have modiﬁed here to illustrate the new type of ﬁxed point.
An Investor I has been given the right to make an investment in “futures,” a ﬁxed number
of shares in a speciﬁc company that he can reserve on the ﬁrst day of any month he chooses.
Exactly one month later, the shares will be delivered and will collectively have a market value
on that day.
His problem is to decide when to make his reservation so that his overall proﬁt is maximised,
where the proﬁt is the diﬀerence between the shares’ price he pays when he makes the reservation
and their actual value when he receives them one month later.
The details are as follows:
(a) The market value (share price) v of the shares is a whole number of dollars
between $0 and $10 inclusive; it has a probability p of going up by $1 in
any month, and 1−p of going down by $1 — but it remains within those
bounds. The probability p represents short-term market uncertainty.
(b) Probability p itself varies month-by-month in steps of 0.1 between zero and
one: when v is less than $5 the probability that p will rise is 2/3; when v is
more than $5 the probability of p’s falling is 2/3; and when v is $5 exactly
the probability is 1/2 of going either way. The movement of p represents
the Investors’ knowledge of long-term “cyclic second-order” trends.
(c) There is a cap c on the value of v, initially $10, which has probability 1/2
of falling by $1 in any month; otherwise it remains where it is. The “falling
cap” models the fact that the company is in a slow decline.
(d) If in a given month the Investor does not reserve, then at the very next
month he might ﬁnd he is temporarily barred from doing so. But he cannot
be barred two months consecutively.
(e) If he never reserves, then he receives no shares and his proﬁt is thus zero.
If it were not for Item (c), the Investor’s strategy would be obvious, that
is “wait until p = 1 — however long that takes — and make a reservation
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only then.” That way the shares would be certain to increase in the month
following his investment and, whatever the (current) market price, the actual
price would be greater, guaranteeing him a maximum proﬁt. With (c) however
the shares’ value might be forced down to zero before he makes his reservation;
then he would make no proﬁt at all.
To analyse this example, we formalise it as a game played by the Market
and the Investor: whereas the Investor wishes to maximise his proﬁt, the
Market works to minimise it. The utility of the SSG is that we can use it
to contruct a formula describing the ﬂuctuation of the Market as well as the
options the Investor has for “playing” it.
First we describe the movement of the Market during one month’s activity
(refer to Items (a), (b) and (c) above). The state space is (v, p, c), whose value
varies according to the transition system
m =ˆ v: = (v + 1)  c p⊕ (v − 1) unionsq 0;
if v < 5 then p: = (p−0.1) unionsq 0 1/3⊕ (p+0.1)  1
elsif v > 5 then p: = (p−0.1) unionsq 0 2/3⊕ (p+0.1)  1
else p: = (p−0.1) unionsq 0 1/2⊕ (p+0.1)  1
ﬁ;
c: = (c− 1) unionsq 0 1/2⊕ c .
The operators unionsq and  are used conveniently to encode the bounds on the
share price and the probability.
Next we combine the (above) transition system with the actions of the
Investor and the barring process to describe the complete Investor/Market
system. The result is the formula (5) below, the details of which we now
explain. We use the label “month” to denote the transition system m given
above, and a constant expectation “Sold” to denote the function returning just
the value of the v component of the state. We then express the expected value
of the shares one month later as {month}Sold, which when interpreted over m
averages Sold over the probabilities of the new share price. For example if v
is 3, and p is 3/4 and c is 5 at the beginning of the month, then the expected
value of the shares one month later is 3/4× 4+1/4× 2 = 3.5; this is precisely
the meaning of {month}Sold evaluated at state (3, 3/4, 5).
The function “Proﬁt” is deﬁned to be {month}Sold− Sold, and represents
the Investor’s expected proﬁt if he decides to reserve in some particular month.
If he decides against investing, then his only other option is to wait, and
what happens then is expressed by the subformula {month}(X  {month}X);
notice how this introduces the possibility of barring by means of the  choice
under the control of the Market. Collecting everything together we obtain the
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formula describing precisely the Investor/Market game:
Game =ˆ (τ0 X · Proﬁt unionsq {month}(X  {month}X)) ,(5)
where in the subformula {month}(X  {month}X), the variable X has been
bound to a ﬁxed point τ0 . We have chosen τ0 since we are equating inﬁnite
paths with the Investor’s decision never to invest, and his proﬁt in that sit-
uation is, of course 0 (refer to Item(e)). Note, however, that this is not a
standard SSG, nor is τ0 simply a least- or greatest ﬁxed point in disguise. To
see that, observe that Proﬁt can take on both positive and negative values,
depending on whether the share price is more likely to increase or to decrease
at the beginning of a particular month. Thus 0 is neither the greatest nor the
least value within the complete range of payoﬀs.
To compute the value of Formula (5) (and therefore the Investor’s ex-
pected overall payoﬀ) our theorems suggest ﬁrst to translate it into a game
with payoﬀs in the range [0, 1] using an aﬃne transformation (Lem. 3.1); next
to convert that game into a standard SSG (Thm. 4.8), next to solve that
game (Thm. 2.1) and then to translate the result back again (Lem. 3.1). Un-
fortunately this is quite ineﬃcient due to the introduced double ﬁxed point
(especially if iterative methods must be used).
However in this case there is an eﬃcient solution. We notice that in this
case the value can be computed by iterating from 0.
Lemma 5.1 In the game (τx X · Φ), if x ≤ F (x) then V
∗ = limn→∞ F
n(x),
where expectation-to-expectation function F is the denotation of Φ(·) as a
function of the value denoted by X.
Proof. Under the assumption given, the value of the x-gadget game (Def. 4.3)
reduces easily to limn→∞ F
n(x) in the case that the payoﬀs are all in ES; the
general case follows from Lem. 3.1. 
Using Lem. 5.1 we created a Mathematica script which encoded the game
given by (5), and iterated directly from 0. The initial value of p was set at
0.5 and the cap c to the maximum 10; a selection of the results appear in the
table below:
Initial share value 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Best expected proﬁt 0.59 0.57 0.53 0.47 0.40 0.33 0.27 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.18
The results show that there is always some probability of observing a rising
market, but that waiting longer for a more favourable value of p is possible
when the intitial share price is far from the value of the cap c.
A. McIver, C. Morgan / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 153 (2006) 195–212 211
6 Conclusions and further work
In this paper we have introduced a novel quantitative two-player game which
models situations where neither player wins decisively. We deﬁned a new
kind of ﬁxed point as a convenient way to model this situation directly, but
showed how the original qMμ can in fact model it using interleaved ﬁxed points.
The consequence of encoding it as a standard SSG suggests the possibility of
developing algorithms for computing the value using some of the techniques
developed for stochastic parity games [1]; however we note that the increase
in alternation depth implicit in the gadget-encoding of Def. 4.3 might impact
their eﬃciency. That remains a topic for further investigation.
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